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I. TESTING THE THEOREM
Ronald Coase taught us, what of course we should already have known,
that when it is to the benefit of people to reach an agreement, they will
seek to reach it. Reaching agreement can be costly in time and other re-
sources, so many potential agreements will not be achieved, but these
unachieved agreements will have been inhibited by the smallness of the
benefits or the largeness of the costs of agreement.
Does the proposition require proof? One would think not. It is similar
to a proposition in international trade: The prices of internationally
traded goods in two national markets will differ by no more than the cost
of movement of the goods between the markets. Suppose I started to test
the proposition and found that a pair of prices differed by more than the
costs of movement. I would immediately abandon the test and embark on
lucrative arbitrage transactions. Similarly, if I found that Coase's famous
grain farmer and cattle rancher were making foolish decisions with re-
spect to the damage to grain from wandering cattle, I would buy the two
enterprises and reap a capital gain from an efficient reorganization.
However, that cannot be the entire story; human behavior is not so
rigorously deterministic as a multiplication table. There are people who
do not care for wealth, more who do not reason well, and vastly more who
are incompletely informed. These people will not necessarily achieve opti-
mal agreements, and especially is this true in new circumstances. We do
not believe that such people govern important markets: Others who love
wealth, reason precisely, and buy information in optimal quantities will
call the tune. So one set of empirical studies could be directed to the deter-
mination of the efficiency of small markets with special attention to short-
run reactions to altered circumstances ("shocks"). Examples of such situa-
tions are (1) the reactions of wages of highly specialized people to large,
unpredicted changes in the demand for their services, and (2) the structure
of prices in markets for inexpensive antiques.
A second and much more interesting and important set of studies could
be directed to the costs of achieving agreements ("transaction costs"). In
fact such studies have been undertaken by Demsetz, Williamson, and
many others, and much attention has been lavished upon the security
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markets.' But neither this set of studies nor those of inefficient markets is
directed to the logic of the Coase Theorem but instead to its domain. This
is not to minimize the desirability of the studies-after all, it is the do-
main of applicability of a theory that determines its importance to a
science.
II. THE COASE THEOREM AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME
Consider the following simple model of the Coase Theorem (in a re-
gime of zero transaction costs). Kansas is about to be opened for settle-
ment. The promise of the state is made-and believed-that the perma-
nent rule will be that all grain farmers (or alternatively, cattle ranchers)
are required to erect fences to protect crops from cattle. Both products will
be sold in world markets at fixed prices. On a given day settlers are al-
lowed to enter the state, and soon all the land has been settled.
I assert the proposition: Contrary to the received understanding of the
Coase Theorem, with either assignment of fencing costs, the distribution
of income among settlers will be the same.
Clearly the settlers as laborers will maximize their returns by allocating
themselves between grain and cattle farms (whose numbers are fixed by
endowments of the two kinds of land) so that the marginal products of
homogeneous labor are equal. In the Homestead Act system, with each
farm having 160 acres, there will in general be more laborers than farms
(or land would be free), so some settlers will be only farm employees.
This distribution of labor depends only upon the most profitable outputs
of corn and cattle, which by the Coase Theorem is independent of the
assignment of fencing costs.
Moreover, the net rent of each kind of land (after fencing costs) would
be bid to equality by settlers if the initial sale of land were done by com-
petitive auction. Hence the relative values of the two kinds of land would
depend upon where fencing costs were assigned, but that would not affect
the land wealth of settlers. Rents of both kinds of land would be capital-
ized at the same rate in the competitive auction.
If the land is sold to settlers at a fixed, almost nominal price, as was
done with the Homestead Act, then windfall gains are obtained by the
initial settlers-who would settle first on the kind of land with a higher
net rental value. This difference in windfall gains would arise, not from
the property or tort law, but from the method of allocating lands to
settlers.
The Coase Theorem is of course consistent with the fundamental theo-
rem of competitive markets, that homogeneous resources receive equal re-
turns in all uses. The state may shift rights from one party to another and
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confer short-run gains and losses: for example, by unexpectedly transfer-
ring larger rights in intellectual property to artists or inventors. In the
long run, however, the various parties will continue to earn only competi-
tive rates of return, and even in the short run the Coase theorem allows
the allocation of resources to be unaffected.
A stable property or tort law, to repeat, would not affect the distribu-
tion of income.

